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Abstract
Purpose—The 2012 multistate fungal meningitis outbreak caused by contaminated 
methylprednisolone suggests that contaminated compounded drugs can pose a public health threat. 
The problem has not been well described. Our objective was to systematically review the literature 
to describe: a) features of infectious outbreaks associated with exposure to contaminated drugs 
produced by compounding pharmacies, b) sterile compounding procedures that caused microbial 
contamination, and c) outbreak features relevant for detection and investigation.
Methods—We searched PubMed (reviewing 850 citations) and the CDC and FDA Web sites to 
identify infectious outbreaks associated with compounding pharmacies outside the hospital setting 
between January 2000 and November 2012. We extracted information from peer-reviewed 
literature, FDA and CDC documents, meeting abstracts, and congressional testimony.
Results—Between 2000 and prior to the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak, 11 infectious 
outbreaks from contaminated compounded drugs were reported involving 207 case-patients with 
17 deaths (8.2% case fatality rate). The 2012 meningitis outbreak increased totals almost 5-fold. 
Half the outbreaks involved case-patients in more than 1 state. Three outbreaks involved 
ophthalmic drugs: trypan blue and Brilliant Blue-G ophthalmic solutions used during surgery, and 
triamcinolone and bevacizumab for intravitreal injection. Remaining outbreaks involved 
corticosteroids (n=2), heparin flush solutions (n=2), cardioplegia, intravenous magnesium sulfate, 
total parenteral nutrition, and fentanyl. The outbreaks were caused by pathogens commonly 
associated with healthcare associated infections (n=6), common skin commensals (n=1), and 
organisms that rarely cause infection (n=5). Morbidity was substantial, including vision loss; 
mortality rates during earlier outbreaks were similar to the 2012 meningitis outbreak. A variety of 
problems with sterile procedures were found. No single source reported all outbreaks.
Conclusion—Sporadic but serious infectious outbreaks associated with contaminated drugs 
from compounding pharmacies occurred before the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak. These 
outbreaks illustrate root causes that could be addressed with preventive policies and practices.
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Background
The 2012 multistate fungal meningitis outbreak caused by contaminated injectable 
methylprednisolone manufactured by New England Compounding Center (NECC) has 
raised concerns about the quality of compounded drugs.1 Within 2 months of initially 
detecting the outbreak, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and state 
health agencies identified 490 case-patients with serious fungal infection, including 
meningitis, stroke or other central nervous system-related infection (n=478) and joint 
infection (n=12); 34 case-patients had died, and the outbreak involved 19 states.2 The CDC 
estimated that approximately 14,000 patients received injections from 3 lots of 
methylprednisolone.2 The number of patients exposed to this contaminated compounded 
drug is unprecedented, the clinical consequences severe, and many will undergo additional 
invasive procedures and treatments.3 This scenario is unusual, but may only be the tip of the 
iceberg. There is no single summary in the peer-reviewed literature describing infectious 
outbreaks linked to compounded drugs.
Under the traditional definition of pharmacy compounding, a pharmacist compounds a 
medication for a single patient after receipt of a prescription written by a single clinician.4 
Traditional compounding practices are regulated by state boards of pharmacy to meet the 
needs of patients not served by FDA-approved drugs. Compounding pharmacies are not 
required to establish efficacy and safety, obtain FDA approval, or comply with 
manufacturing and labeling standards for compounded drugs.5 In contrast, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers are regulated by the FDA and must comply with Good Manufacturing 
Practices. Over the last few decades, the regulatory gap between state regulation of 
traditional compounding practices and FDA regulation of pharmaceutical manufacturing has 
allowed the proliferation of compounding pharmacies that distribute large quantities of 
compounded sterile products nationwide. According to the International Academy for 
Compounding Pharmacists, 1 to 3% of all prescriptions in the US are compounded.6 An 
estimated 7,500 pharmacies in the US provide advanced compounding services, including 
approximately 3,000 that provide sterile compounding services.6 Only about 2% of 
compounding pharmacies participate in the industry’s voluntary accreditation program.5
Since 2000, the FDA has issued numerous warnings about quality problems with 
compounded drugs,1 including problems with potency7-10 and sterility11, and the presence 
of particulates12, 13 or contaminants.14, 15 In 2001 and 2006, FDA investigators found that 
30% of compounded drug samples they tested contained either too little or too much of the 
active ingredient.16, 17 This compared to a testing failure rate of less than 2% for FDA-
approved prescription drugs.16
In the past, potential outbreaks have been averted before compounded drugs reached large 
numbers of patients.18 In 2003, a compounding pharmacy that specialized in respiratory 
drugs issued a partial recall of two batches of albuterol/ipratropium respiratory solution 
(more than 1 million doses) that were contaminated with B cepacia.11 A full recall was 
issued after the Missouri Board of Pharmacy obtained a restraining order to halt further 
dispensing of contaminated respiratory solutions. More than 19,000 patients throughout the 
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US may have been exposed to the contaminated drug, but no known infections resulted from 
this event.
We questioned whether infectious outbreaks associated with contaminated compounded 
drugs are a new or recurring problem, and whether there are features associated with 
compounded drugs or surveillance systems that may hinder outbreak detection. Outbreak 
detection requires that a person or automated system recognizes unusual events, and systems 
are in place to enable reporting and investigation. Therefore, the objective of this analysis 
was to describe: a) features of infectious outbreaks associated with exposure to 
contaminated drugs produced by compounding pharmacies outside the hospital setting, b) 
sterile compounding procedures associated with microbial contamination, and c) outbreak 
features relevant for detection and investigation.
Methods
First, we searched the literature available in PubMed using MeSH term combinations of 
Drug Compounding and Drug Contamination, Drug Compounding and Disease Outbreaks, 
MMWR[ta] and Drug Contamination, Drug Compounding and Medication Errors, and Drug 
Compounding tagged with the subheading ‘adverse effects’. We reviewed 850 citations 
published between January 2000 and November 2012. Second, we manually reviewed 
content on the FDA ‘Pharmacy Compounding’ Web page1 to identify the name of potential 
pharmacies involved in outbreaks, then expanded our search of the FDA Web site for 
additional documents about the pharmacies identified. Third, we used terms associated with 
compounding pharmacies and the infectious organisms in the identified outbreaks to 
manually search CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports (MMWR)19, and abstracts 
from CDC’s Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) annual meetings available on the CDC 
Web site for 2006 through 2012.20
We selected infectious outbreaks in the US that were determined after public health 
investigation to result from exposure to drugs that were likely contaminated during 
production by a compounding pharmacy. We limited our analysis to compounding 
pharmacies that prepare sterile products outside the hospital setting and to outbreaks 
identified since January 2000 with information available as of November 25, 2012.
After identifying an outbreak that met our selection criteria, we extracted information (in 
order of precedence if content differed between sources) from government publications 
(including FDA Enforcement Letters and recall notices), peer-reviewed literature, 
congressional testimony, and meeting abstracts. The information was used to describe the a) 
triggers that led to outbreak detection, b) number and location of case-patients involved, c) 
drug name and route of administration, d) infectious organisms and clinical outcomes, e) 
name and location of the compounding pharmacy, and f) findings from the investigation. For 
one outbreak, the publication indicated that case-patients were located in 7 states but the 
states were not described. We assumed that the 7 state public health officials that authored 
the report represented the 7 states where case-patients were identified.21
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Results
We identified and describe 12 outbreaks (including the most recent outbreak associated with 
NECC) that met the inclusion criteria (Table 1 and 2). These outbreaks specifically 
involving pharmacies that compound drugs outside the hospital setting. No single source 
provided information about all 12 outbreaks. Ten of the eligible outbreaks were identified 
using PubMed, including 6 outbreaks reported in peer-reviewed journals, 2 outbreaks 
reported in MMWR, and 2 outbreaks reported in both MMWR and a peer-reviewed journal. 
Two additional outbreaks were identified from EIS conference abstracts (outbreaks #7 and 
9). Information about 5 of the pharmacies involved in the identified outbreaks were listed on 
the FDA ‘Pharmacy Compounding’ page as of November 28, 2012 (outbreak # 4,7,9-11) 
(Table 2). Information about outbreak #12, the NECC multistate fungal meningitis outbreak, 
was readily available on the FDA site. Once we identified the names of pharmacies 
involved, we found additional documents about 9 of the outbreaks using the FDA Web site 
search engine (outbreak #2, 4-7, 9-12). The outbreaks identified were investigated by state 
or federal public health authorities, or both.
Outbreak descriptions
Between January 2000 and prior to the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak associated with 
NECC, we identified 11 outbreaks involving 207 infected case-patients with 17 deaths 
following exposure to contaminated compounded drugs (Table 1). The overall case fatality 
rate was 8.2%. The 11 outbreaks involved from 2 to 80 patients each and occurred 
sporadically. When the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak was included, the totals increased 
almost 5-fold (as of March 9, 2013), to 927 infected case-patients with 65 deaths (case 
fatality rate: 7%).
Including the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak, the 12 outbreaks were associated with 13 
drugs (Table 1). Three outbreaks involved 4 ophthalmic drugs: trypan blue ophthalmic 
solution used during cataract surgery, Brilliant Blue-G ophthalmic solution used during 
vitrectomy, and triamcinolone and bevacizumab for intravitreal injection. Three outbreaks 
involved methylprednisolone or betamethasone primarily for epidural injections. Two 
outbreaks involved heparin flush and heparin-vancomycin flush solutions for indwelling 
catheters. The remaining 4 outbreaks involved cardioplegia and intravenous magnesium 
sulfate, total parenteral nutrition, and fentanyl (Table 1).
The most recent 3 outbreaks involved drugs that were preservative-free formulations 
intended for intravitreal, intra-articular, or epidural injection (Tables 1 and 2). Information 
about preservatives was not available for earlier outbreaks.
The outbreaks were caused by organisms that are commonly associated with healthcare 
associated infections (Serratia marcescens [3 outbreaks], Burkholderia cepacia [2 
outbreaks], and Pseudomonas aeruginosa [1 outbreak]); organisms considered commensal 
but can be associated with infection (Streptococcus mitis/oralis[1 outbreak]); and organisms 
that rarely cause infection, (Exserohilum rostratum, Fusarium incarnatum-equiseti, 
Bipolaris hawaiiensis, Pseudomonas fluorescens, Exophiala dermatitidis and Sphingomonas 
paucimobilis). Time between exposure and onset or recognition of symptoms varied among 
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the outbreaks by organism, route of exposure, and presence of indwelling catheters (Table 
1). For example, in the outbreak of P fluorescens bloodstream infections, 59% of the 80 
case-patients developed symptoms within 24 hours following exposure to contaminated 
heparin-saline flush while the remaining 41% were diagnosed from 84 to 421 days after the 
last potential exposure to a contaminated flush.22 Delayed onset of symptoms and 
recognition of infection has also been observed in the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak. 23
Among the 65 case-patients that died in all 12 outbreaks (as of March 9, 2013), at least 38 
died of meningitis (and 14 others died from meningitis or other causes24) following epidural 
injections of betamethasone or methylprednisolone, 10 died of bloodstream infections 
following intravenous administration of magnesium sulfate or total parenteral nutrition, and 
3 died of systemic inflammatory response syndrome (SIRS) following administration of a 
cardioplegia solution during coronary artery bypass graft surgery. The case-fatality rate 
varied by route of administration, ranging from 27% for case-patients that received 
contaminated cardioplegia solution during heart surgery, 7.8% for drugs administered 
intravenously, and 7.0% for epidural or intra-articular administration.
Among the 51 case-patients who developed endophthalmitis after exposure to contaminated 
Trypan Blue or Brilliant Blue-G during ophthalmic surgery or intravitreal injection of 
bevacizumab or triamcinolone, none died. However, the patients with endophthalmitis 
required repeat surgery (rates of 80-83% reported for outbreaks #10 and 11), experienced 
high rates of vision loss (ranging from 77% to 100% in the 3 outbreaks) and 5 patients 
(10%) were reported to undergo evisceration or enucleation of the affected eye 
(14%).21, 25, 26
Implicated pharmacies and practices
Drugs involved in the outbreaks were compounded by 12 pharmacies located in 10 states 
throughout the US (Table 2). Two-thirds (n=8) of the outbreaks involved case-patients 
exposed to drugs compounded by a pharmacy located in a different state (Figure 1), and half 
involved case-patients located in more than 1 state. In only 3 outbreaks, the compounding 
pharmacy and case-patients were located in the same state. One additional outbreak (#6) was 
likely limited to 1 state, but the location of the case-patients was not provided.25
A source of contamination at the implicated pharmacy was not established in 5 outbreaks. 
However, the remaining investigations uncovered a myriad of problems including improper 
autoclave performance or failure to follow autoclave procedures, no sterility testing of 
finished product, inadequate clean room or environmental sampling practices, failure to 
follow recommended filter-sterilization processes, and inadequate staff training and quality 
assurance processes (Table 2). After investigation, sterility could not be assured for any 
products from the compounding facilities associated with 6 (50%) of the 12 outbreaks, 
leading to recall of all of the companies sterile products (including #1,2,7,9,11, and 12).
Outbreak detection
Scenarios that led to initial recognition of these outbreaks varied (Table 1). In 2 outbreaks 
(#2 and #12), an astute clinician or laboratorian reported 1 or 2 cases of rare infections that 
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triggered active surveillance and a public health response. The remaining outbreaks were 
only identified when a cluster of case-patients from a common hospital or clinic presented 
with similar clinical characteristics to a common setting. The 2005 outbreak of S marcescens 
bloodstream infections was independently detected in 2 states simultaneously. Investigation 
of the 2012 outbreak of fungal endophthalmitis associated with Brilliant Blue-G led to the 
detection of a second contaminated drug (intravitreal triamcinolone) from the same 
compounding pharmacy associated with additional case-patients.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic summary in the literature of infectious 
outbreaks associated with drugs compounded by pharmacies outside the hospital setting. 
The reported infectious outbreaks were severe and half involved case-patients in multiple 
states. The 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak was the largest; however, the case morbidity 
and fatality rates were similar to earlier outbreaks. Case-patients lost their vision, required 
hospitalization, surgeries, or treatments, and about 7% lost their lives. Each outbreak 
illustrated one or more root causes that could have been addressed with preventive policies 
and practices (Figure 2). In particular, the literature described lapses in recommended 
processes for producing sterile compounded drugs and evidence that clinicians were 
sometimes unaware they were using compounded drugs. This lack of awareness may 
obfuscate links between adverse events and compounded drugs, and lead to under-
recognition and under-reporting of problems. No single source included information about 
all the outbreaks.
Several of the outbreaks involved suspensions or solutions that were were reported to be 
preservative-free or were likely preservative-free, including methylprednisolone suspension 
(preservative status unknown; outbreak #2), preservative-free bevacizumab solution 
(outbreak #10), preservative-free triamcinolone (probably a suspension; outbreak #11), and 
preservative-free methylprednisolone suspension (outbreak #12). Although initial 
publications about the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak reported the methylprednisolone was 
a solution, congressional documents later identified it as a suspension.27, 28 The 
betamethasone formulation in outbreak #1 was also likely a suspension because it was 
compounded to replace an FDA-approved injectable betamethasone suspension that was not 
available at the time. Some compounding pharmacies market preservative-free 
corticosteroids for epidural injection as an alternative to FDA-approved products that 
contain a preservative. The rationale is that preservative-free formulations may avoid 
potential neurotoxicity (aseptic meningitis, arachnoiditis). Compounded drugs are also 
sometimes favored because of lower costs and ready availability during shortages of 
commercial products.5, 22 Clinicians who use compounded preservative-free solutions and 
suspensions need to weigh the risks and benefits of these competing concerns.
Compounded sterile products that are preservative-free have a high risk of microbial 
contamination if standards in United States Pharmacopoeia chapter <797> Pharmaceutical 
Compounding–Sterile Preparations (USP <797>) are not strictly followed.29 Sterile 
suspensions in particular may have a high risk of microbial contamination if inappropriate 
sterilization methods are used. Sterilization of suspensions by heat may not adequately 
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remove pyrogens and fungal contaminants.30 Likewise, sterilization by filtration may be 
problematic because suspensions can clog a 0.2 micron filter. Some experts recommend 
against the use of compounded injectable corticosteroid suspensions on the basis that 
sterilization methods available to compounding pharmacies are inadequate.30
In the bevacizumab outbreak (#10), preservative-free single-dose vials of bevacizumab 
solution were repackaged into multiple 0.1 mL syringes for multiple patients. A number of 
endophthalmitis outbreaks with compounded bevacizumab have been linked to poor aseptic 
technique and non-adherence to requirements for the safe repackaging of single-dose vials 
outlined in USP <797>.12 The CDC has taken the position that single-dose vials should only 
be used for 1 patient, and advises that repackaging of unopened single-dose vials for 
multiple patients should only occur in times of critical need and should be performed in 
accordance with USP <797>.31
The outbreaks we identified in the literature were those that were investigated and reported 
by public health authorities after they were identified by clinicians. Investigations of 
reported compounded drug outbreaks were triggered when they were associated with a 
cluster of unusual infections (e.g., postprocedural endophthalmitis) or when the identified 
organism was somehow atypical, because it rarely causes infection or was cultured from an 
unexpected site. For example, the initial report of a patient with culture-confirmed 
Aspergillus fumigatus meningitis 46 days after an epidural steroid injection was sufficient to 
trigger active surveillance and led to the rapid recognition of additional case-patients with 
similar exposures28. This finding heralded the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak28. Outbreaks 
may be more difficult to detect when exposures and case-patients are scattered 
geographically, or when clinical outcomes are less severe and patients have underlying 
conditions or treatments that could explain their outcomes. For example, even perceptive 
clinicians may miss compounded drugs as a source in common and expected infections, 
such as with central line associated bloodstream infections (e.g., S marcescens sepsis in 
patients receiving TPN or magnesium sulfate). Lack of clinician awareness that patients 
even received a compounded product can be a factor that delays, or prevents, the recognition 
of the source of an outbreak. For example, in the S. marsescens bloodstream infections 
outbreak following cardiac surgery, neither of the hospital pharmacies was aware the 
product was compounded as “there was no specific indication on the package labeling, and 
the company’s website did not specify that the product was compounded.”32 In addition, 
redistribution of products from a compounding pharmacy before delivery to the final 
customer may limit the recognition of the potential role of compounded drugs in an 
infectious outbreak. For example, in the P fluorescens bloodstream infection outbreak, a 
company employed a compounding pharmacy to make a concentrated heparin solution 
which was then diluted and repackaged to make heparin-saline flush syringes.22 These 
syringes were “sold to distributors who redistributed to other medical distributors and 
hospitals.”33 Such redistribution can blur the recognition of a common source.
To identify and link unusual infections across settings, there is a need for robust surveillance 
systems that support detection and reporting. Existing systems have limitations. First, 
communicable disease and injury reporting systems that require reporting of selected 
diseases and conditions to public health departments34 may capture events, but 
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underreporting is common.35, 36 In addition, the types of infections associated with 
contaminated compounded drugs would rely on general reporting requirements, such as 
“[Report] any unusual occurrence of infectious or communicable disease ….”37 Even when 
providers recognize and consider reporting unusual events, they can be stymied by concerns 
about potential Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) violations. 
Second, the CDC National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) includes a Patient Safety 
Component, but this component would be unlikely to detect events from compounded drugs, 
because it is focused on surveillance of a) infections associated with devices or common 
procedures, or multidrug-resistant organisms, and b) events associated with dialysis and 
blood products.38 NHSN is not designed to address surveillance of sporadic adverse drug 
events in outpatient settings, and does not provide real time reporting.
We focused our evaluation on compounding pharmacies in the community, rather than 
pharmacies that compound drugs in the hospital setting, because the former type of 
pharmacy may present unique public health risks. The large scale of production and 
multistate distribution of products from sterile compounding pharmacies may contribute to 
the size of outbreaks when they occur. In the 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak associated 
with NECC, approximately 17,600 doses of methylprednisolone were shipped to 76 
facilities in 23 states and an estimated 14,000 patients were exposed.27 As the outbreak 
progressed, more than 4,000 drugs made by NECC and its sister company, Ameridose, were 
voluntarily recalled. The volume of recalled drugs was large enough to exacerbate drug 
shortages.39 The size of these companies does not appear to be an anomaly. Central 
Admixture Pharmacy Services (outbreak # 7) reports making 300,000 deliveries of 
intravenous admixtures each year.40 PharMEDium (outbreak # 4) employs over 700 people 
and provides sterile compounding services to over 1800 hospitals in 49 US states. 32, 41
Limitations
Our study has limitations. In particular, our strategy for identifying outbreaks missed 
outbreaks not reported in the literature or investigated by the FDA or CDC. For example, an 
EpiNotes publication by the North Carolina Department of Health commented on 2 patients 
that developed Chryseomonas meningitis from compounded epidural methylprednisolone in 
2001, but the details are unpublished.42 Despite this limitation, this paper summarizes the 
current published literature describing outbreaks of infection associated with drugs 
compounded outside the hospital setting, which likely presents an underestimate of the 
problem.
Recommendations
We recommend addressing the root causes identified in these outbreaks (Figure 2), including 
the regulatory gap, compounding processes, awareness among clinicians, and the public 
health systems required to monitor compounding practices and identify and respond to 
outbreaks. Compounding pharmacies should fully comply with USP <797>, the standard for 
sterile compounding safety in the US29, 43 In 2011, state regulations had not consistently 
adopted USP <797> as the standard for sterile compounding in their jurisdiction (http://
clinicaliq.com/797-state-survey), and compliance among compounding pharmacies was 
found to be 72% among 1,148 respondents from hospital settings and 82% among a limited 
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sample of 40 respondents from community pharmacy settings.44 In addition, electronic 
health record systems should be enhanced to recognize links between compounded drugs 
and infections. This would require improvements in: a) real-time processing of triggers for 
unusual organisms, unusual organism/specimen source combinations, or rare diagnoses 
(e.g., endophthalmitis); b) improved coding of compounded drugs in the electronic health 
record to identify compounded drugs); and c) sharing of laboratory results not explicitly 
defined in public health communicable disease reporting rules, but indicative of unusual 
infections.
Conclusion
Prior to the nationwide 2012 fungal meningitis outbreak associated with NECC, 
compounded drugs produced by compounding pharmacies were associated with 11 other 
outbreaks that occurred sporadically over the past 12 years. These earlier outbreaks, though 
not as large, had substantial morbidity and a mortality rate that was similar to the NECC 
outbreak. Lapses in sterile compounding procedures led to contamination of compounded 
drugs, exposure to patients, and a threat to public health. Recognition of these outbreaks and 
subsequent public health investigation was usually triggered by the occurrence of multiple 
case-patients in a single healthcare setting. Given that drugs and patients are distributed 
widely, compounded drugs are not always produced using USP <797> standards, and 
surveillance systems are not optimized to detect these outbreaks in outpatient settings, public 
health authorities should address root causes to improve the safe use of compounded drugs.
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Figure 1. 
Location of implicated compounding pharmacies and associated case patients involved in 
eight multistate outbreaks identified between January 2000 and November 2012.
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Figure 2. 
Description of factors that may contribute to infectious outbreaks associated with 
compounded drug
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